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Abstract
We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods
among n agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods. We first consider the Nash social
welfare as our objective and design a polynomial-time algorithm that, in the value oracle model, finds
an 8n-approximation to the Nash optimal allocation. Subadditive valuations include XOS (fraction-
ally subadditive) and submodular valuations as special cases. Our result, even for the special case of
submodular valuations, improves upon the previously best known O(n log n)-approximation ratio of
Garg et al. (2020).
More generally, we study maximization of p-mean welfare. The p-mean welfare is parameterized
by an exponent term p ∈ (−∞, 1] and encompasses a range of welfare functions, such as social welfare
(p = 1), Nash social welfare (p → 0), and egalitarian welfare (p → −∞). We give an algorithm that,
for subadditive valuations and any given p ∈ (−∞, 1], computes (in the value oracle model and in
polynomial time) an allocation with p-mean welfare at least 1/8n times the optimal.
Further, we show that our approximation guarantees are essentially tight for XOS and, hence, sub-
additive valuations. We adapt a result of Dobzinski et al. (2010) to show that, under XOS valuations,
an O
(
n1−ε
)
approximation for the p-mean welfare for any p ∈ (−∞, 1] (including the Nash social
welfare) requires exponentially many value queries; here, ε > 0 is any fixed constant.
1 Introduction
In discrete fair division, given a set of m goods and n agents, the problem is to integrally allocate the
set of goods to the agents in a fair and (economically) efficient manner [BCE+16; End17; Azi19]. In
this thread of work, the Nash social welfare—defined as the geometric mean of the agents’ valuations
for their assigned bundles—has emerged as a fundamental and prominent measure of the quality of
an allocation. It provides a balance between two central objectives: the social welfare (the sum of the
agents’ valuations) and the egalitarian welfare (the minimum valuation across the agents). Note that
social welfare is a standard measure of (economic) efficiency, whereas egalitarian welfare is a fairness
objective.
A Nash optimal allocation (i.e., an allocation that maximizes Nash social welfare) satisfies other fair-
ness and efficiency criteria as well. Such an allocation is clearly Pareto optimal. Furthermore, if agents
have additive valuations, then a Nash optimal allocation is known to be fair in the sense that it is guar-
anteed to be envy-free up to one good (EF1) [CKM+19] and proportional up to one good (PROP1) [CFS17].1
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1An allocation is said to be EF1 iff for any pair of agents i and j, there exists a good g in j’s bundle, such that i prefers her
bundle to the one obtained after removing g from j’s bundle. An allocation is said to be PROP1 iff for each agent i there exists
a good g with the property that including g into i’s bundle ensures that i achieves a proportional share, i.e., her valuation ends
up being at least 1/n times her value for all the goods.
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As an objective, Nash social welfare is scale invariant: multiplicatively scaling any agent’s valu-
ation function by a nonnegative factor does not change the Nash optimal allocation. Furthermore,
interesting connections have been established between market models and this welfare function; see,
e.g., [CDG+17; BKV18]. As a practical application, the website spliddit.org uses the Nash social wel-
fare as the optimization objective when partitioning indivisible goods [GP15; CKM+19].
However, computing a Nash optimal allocation is APX-hard, even when the agents have additive
valuations [Lee17]. In terms of approximation algorithms, the problem of maximizing Nash social wel-
fare has received considerable attention in recent years [CG15; CDG+17; AGSS17; BGHM17; AGMV18;
BKV18; GHM18]. In particular, a polynomial-time e1/e-approximation algorithm is known for additive
valuations [BKV18]. This algorithm preserves EF1, up to a factor of (1 + ε), and Pareto optimality. The
approximation guarantee of e1/e ≈ 1.45 also holds for budget-additive valuations [CCG+18]. The work
of Garg et al. [GKK20] extends this line of work by considering Nash social welfare maximization under
submodular valuations.
Submodular valuations capture the diminishing marginal returns property. They constitute a sub-
class of subadditive valuations, which, in turn, model complement-freeness. Formally, a set function
v (defined over a set of indivisible goods) is subadditive if it satisfies v(A ∪ B) ≤ v(A) + v(B), for all
subsets of goods A and B. Complement-freeness is a very common assumption on valuation functions.
Hence, fair division with subadditive valuations is an encompassing and important problem.
For Nash social welfare maximization under submodular valuations, Garg et al. [GKK20] obtain
an O(n log n)-approximation algorithm. Prior to their work, the best known approximation ratio for
submodular valuations was (m − n + 1), which also extends to subadditive valuations [NR14]; here,
m denotes the number of goods and n the number of agents. For a constant number of agents with
submodular valuations, Garg et al. [GKK20] provide an e/(e − 1)-approximation algorithm and show
that, even in this setting, improving upon e/(e − 1) is NP-hard.
In the context of allocating indivisible goods, two other well-studied welfare objectives are the social
welfare and the egalitarian welfare. These represent, respectively, for an allocation, the average val-
uation of the agents and the minimum valuation of any agent. For the social welfare objective, a tight
approximation factor of e/(e−1) is known under submodular valuations [Von08]. For subadditive valu-
ations, Feige [Fei09] shows that social welfare maximization admits a polynomial-time 2-approximation,
assuming oracle access to demand queries.2
For maximizing egalitarian welfare under additive valuations, Chakrabarty et al. [CCK09] provide
an O˜(nε)-approximation algorithm that runs in time nO(1/ε), for any ε > 0. Under submodular valu-
ations, egalitarian welfare maximization admits an O˜(n1/4m1/2)-approximation algorithm [GHIM09].
Khot and Ponnuswami [KP07] provide a 2n-approximation algorithm for maximizing egalitarian wel-
fare under subadditive valuations. As a lower bound, with submodular valuations, egalitarian welfare
cannot be approximated within a factor of 2, unless P = NP [BD05].
In this work we develop a unified treatment of fairness and efficiency objectives, including the wel-
fare functions mentioned above. In particular, we develop an approximation algorithm for computing
allocations that maximize the generalized mean of the agents’ valuations. Formally, for exponent param-
eter p ∈ R, the pth generalized mean of a set of n positive reals v1, v2, . . . , vn is defined as
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 v
p
i
)1/p
.
For an allocation (partition)A = (A1, . . . , An) of the indivisible goods among the n agents, we define the
p-mean welfare ofA as the generalized mean of the values (vi(Ai))i∈[n]; here vi(Ai) is the value that agent
i has for the bundle Ai assigned to it. Indeed, with different values of p, the p-mean welfare encom-
passes a range of objectives: it corresponds to the social welfare (arithmetic mean) for p = 1, the Nash
social welfare (geometric mean) for p → 0, and the egalitarian welfare for p → −∞. In fact, p-mean
2A demand-query oracle, when queried with prices p1, . . . , pm ∈ R associated with the m goods, returns
maxS⊆[m]
(
v(S)−
∑
j∈S pj
)
, for an underlying valuation function v. The current paper works with more basic value oracle,
which when queried with a subset of goods returns the value this subset. Any value query can be simulated via a polynomial
number of demand queries. However, the converse is not true [NRTV07].
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welfare functions with p ∈ (−∞, 1] exactly correspond to the collection of functions characterized by a
set of natural axioms, including the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle [Mou03]. Hence, p-mean welfare
functions, with p ∈ (−∞, 1], constitute an important and axiomatically-supported family of objectives.
Our Contributions. We develop a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a fair division instance with
subadditive valuations and parameter p ∈ (−∞, 1], finds an allocation with p-mean welfare at least 1/8n
times the optimal p-mean welfare (Theorem 9). Our algorithm uses the standard value oracle model
which, when queried with any subset of goods and an agent i, returns the value that i has for the sub-
set. For different values of p, our algorithm changes minimally, differing only in the weights of edges
for a computed matching. We thus present a unified analysis for this broad class of welfare functions,
suggesting further connections between these objectives than the previously mentioned axiomatization.
Our result matches the best known O(n)-approximation for egalitarian welfare [KP07] and improves
upon the O(n log n)-approximation guarantee of Garg et al. [GKK20] for Nash social welfare with sub-
modular valuations. Arguably, our algorithm (and the analysis) is simpler than the one developed in
[GKK20] and simultaneously more robust, since it obtains an improved approximation ratio for subad-
ditive valuations and a notably broader class of welfare objectives.
For clarity of exposition, we first present an 8n-approximation algorithm for maximizing Nash social
welfare under subadditive valuations (Theorem 2). We then generalize the algorithm to the class of p-
mean welfare objectives.
We complement these algorithmic results by adapting a result of Dobzinski et al. [DNS10] to show
that for XOS valuations, anyO(n1−ε)-approximation for p-meanwelfare requires an exponential number
of value queries (Section 5). Hence, in the value oracle model, our approximation guarantee is essentially
tight for XOS and, hence, for subadditive valuations. We note that these are the first polynomial lower
bounds on approximating either the Nash social welfare or the egalitarian welfare.
Nguyen and Rothe [NR14] obtain an (m−n+1)-approximation guarantee for maximizing Nash so-
cial welfare with subadditive valuations. We establish two extensions of this result. First, we show that,
under subadditive valuations, an (m−n+1)-approximation for the p-mean welfare can be obtained for
all p ≤ 0. However, for 0 < p < 1, we establish that it isNP-hard to obtain an (m−n+1)-approximation,
even under additive valuations. An analogous hardness result holds for p = 1 with submodular valua-
tions.
Section 3 presents our approximation algorithm for maximizing Nash social welfare. Then, Section
4 shows that we can extend the algorithm for Nash social welfare to obtain the stated approximation
bound for p-mean welfare. The tightness of these results is established in Section 5. Section 6 presents
the results for the (m− n+ 1)-approximation guarantees.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
An instance of a fair division problem is a tuple 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉, where [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} denotes the
set of m ∈ N indivisible goods that have to be allocated (partitioned) among the set of n ∈ N agents,
[n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Here, vi : 2[m] 7→ R+ represents the valuation function of agent i ∈ [n]. Specifically,
vi(S) ∈ R+ is the value that agent i has for a subset of goods S ⊆ [m]. For g ∈ [m] and i ∈ [n], write vi(g)
to denote agent i’s value for the good g, i.e., it denotes vi({g}).
We will assume throughout that the valuation function vi for each agent i ∈ [n] is (i) nonnegative:
vi(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ [m], (ii) normalized: vi(∅) = 0, (iii) monotone: vi(A) ≤ vi(B) for all A ⊆ B ⊆ [m],
and (iv) subadditive: vi(A ∪B) ≤ vi(A) + vi(B) for all subsets A,B ⊆ [m].
Submodular and XOS (fractionally subadditive) valuations constitute subclasses of subadditive val-
uations. Formally, a set function v : 2[m] 7→ R+ is said to be submodular if it satisfies the diminishing
marginal returns property: v(A ∪ {g}) − v(A) ≥ v(B ∪ {g}) − v(B), for all subsets A ⊂ B ⊂ [m] and
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g ∈ [m] \B. A set function, v : 2[m] 7→ R+, is said to be XOS if it is obtained by evaluating the maximum
over a collection of additive functions {fr}r∈[L], i.e., v(S) := max1≤j≤L {fr(S)}, for each subset S ⊂ [m].3
We use Πn([m]) to denote the collection of all n partitions of the indivisible goods [m]. An allocation
is an n-partition A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn([m]) of the m goods. Here, Ai denotes the subset of goods
allocated to agent i ∈ [n] and will be referred to as a bundle.
Given a fair division instance I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}i〉, the Nash social welfare of allocation A is defined as
the geometric mean of the agents’ valuations underA: NSW(A) := (∏ni=1 vi(Ai)) 1n .
We will throughout use N ∗ = (N∗1 , . . . , N∗n) to denote an allocation that maximizes the Nash social
welfare for a given fair division instance. We refer to N ∗ as a Nash optimal allocation. An allocation
P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is an α-approximate solution (with α ≥ 1) of the Nash social welfare maximization
problem if NSW(P) ≥ 1αNSW(N ∗).
Besides the Nash social welfare, we address a family of objectives defined by considering the gener-
alized means of agents’ valuations. In particular, for parameter p ∈ R, the the pth generalized (Ho¨lder)
meanMp(·) of n nonnegative numbers x1, . . . , xn ∈ R+ is defined asMp (x1, . . . , xn) :=
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
xpi
) 1
p
.
Parameterized by p, this family of functions captures multiple fairness and efficiency measures. In
particular, when p = 1, Mp reduces to the arithmetic mean. In the limit, Mp is equal to the geometric
mean as p tends to zero. In addition, limp→−∞Mp (x1, . . . , xn) = min{x1, x2, . . . , xn}.
We define the p-mean welfare,Mp(A), of an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) as
Mp(A) := Mp (v1(A1), . . . , vn(An)) =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
vi(Ai)
p
)1/p
.
With p equal to one, zero, and −∞, the p-mean welfare corresponds to the (average) social welfare,
Nash social welfare, and egalitarian welfare, respectively.
The following proposition implies that for any p ≤ −n log n, if instead of the p-mean welfare, we
maximize the egalitarian welfare, then the resulting allocation loses a negligible factor in the approxi-
mation ratio. The proof of this proposition is deferred to Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1. For any n nonnegative numbers x1, . . . , xn ∈ R+ and p ≤ −n log n, we have
M−∞(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ Mp(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ 21/n M−∞(x1, . . . , xn) .
3 An 8n-Approximation for Nash Social Welfare
This section presents an efficient 8n-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization
problem, under subadditive valuations. Our algorithm, Algorithm 1 (ALG), requires access to the valu-
ation functions through basic value queries, i.e., it only requires an oracle which, when queried with a
subset of goods S ⊆ [m] and an agent i ∈ [n], returns vi(S) ∈ R+.
We first describe the ideas behind our algorithm. Write N ∗ = {N∗1 , . . . , N∗n} denote a Nash optimal
allocation in the given instance and let us, for now, assume that the agents have additive valuations, i.e.,
for all agents i ∈ [n] and subset of goods S ⊆ [m], we have vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi(g). In the following two
cases, we can readily obtain an O(n) approximation. In the first case, each agent has a few “high-value”
goods, i.e., each agent i has a good g′i ∈ N∗i with the property that vi(g′i) ≥ vi(N∗i )/n. In such a setting,
we can construct a complete bipartite graph with agents [n] on one side and all the goods [m] on the
other. Here, the weight of edge (i, g) ∈ [n] × [m] is set to be log (vi(g)). In this bipartite graph, the
3Here, L can be exponentially large inm.
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Algorithm 1 ALG
Input: Instance I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉with value oracle access to the valuation functions vis.
Output: An allocation B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn)
1: Initialize iteration count t = 0 and define SATt = ∅ and UNSATt = [n]
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3: Sort the goods in [m] in descending order of value such that vi(g1) ≥ · · · ≥ vi(gm)
4: if vi ([m] \ {g1, . . . , g2n}) = 0 then
5: Set γti = 0
6: else
7: γti = vi([m])
8: end if
9: end for
10: while UNSATt 6= ∅ do
11: Consider the bipartite graph
(
[n] ∪ [m], [n]× [m], {w(i, g)}i∈[n],g∈[m]
)
with weight of edge (i, g) ∈
[n]× [m] set as w(i, g) = log (vi(g) + γti)
12: Compute a left-perfect maximum-weight matching, πt, in this bipartite graph
13: Set G = [m] \ {πt(i)}i∈[n] and A = [n]
14: while there exists a′ ∈ A and g′ ∈ G such that va′(g′) ≥ 12nva′(G) do
15: Set Bta′ = {g′} and update G← G \ {g′} along with A← A \ {a′}
16: end while
17: Set (Bti )i∈A = MOVINGKNIFE (G,A, {vi}i∈A)
18: Define SATt+1 =
{
i ∈ [n] | vi(Bti) ≥ γti
}
and set γt+1i = γ
t
i for each i ∈ SATt+1
19: Define UNSATt+1 =
{
i ∈ [n] | vi(Bti ) < γti
}
and set γt+1i =
(
1− 1m
)
γti for each i ∈ UNSATt+1
20: Update t← t+ 1
21: end while
22: return allocation
(
Bt−11 ∪ {πt−1(1)}, Bt−12 ∪ {πt−1(2)}, . . . , Bt−1n ∪ {πt−1(n)}
)
matching (i, g′i)i∈[n] has Nash social welfare at least 1/n times the optimal and, hence, this also holds for
a left-perfect maximum-weight matching in this graph.
In the second case, all goods are of “low-value”, i.e., for all i ∈ [n] and g ∈ [m] we have vi(g) ≤
vi(N
∗
i )/(2n). Here again an O(n) approximation can be obtained via a simple round-robin algorithm,
wherein the agents (in an arbitrary order) repeatedly pick their highest valued good from those remain-
ing. At a high level, our algorithm stitches together these two extreme cases by first matching high-value
goods and then allocating the low-value ones.
We connect the two cases by considering the following quantity for each agent i ∈ [n]
ℓi := min
S⊂[m]:|S|≤2n
1
2n
vi ([m] \ S) . (1)
That is, ℓi is the (near) proportional value that each agent is guaranteed to achieve even after the
removal of any 2n-size subset of goods. Our algorithm leverages the following existential guarantee
(Lemma 3): there necessarily exists a good ĝi ∈ N∗i with the property that
vi(ĝi) + ℓi ≥ 1
4n
vi(N
∗
i ) . (2)
This result ensures that, a single high-value good (in particular, ĝi) coupled with a 2n-approximation to
all the low-value goods (i.e., ℓi), is sufficient to ensure a 4n-approximation for each agent. At this point,
if we could (i) explicitly compute ℓi for each agent i and (ii) for any size-n subset of goods S, assign
the remaining goods [m] \ S such that each agent gets a bundle of value at least ℓi, then we would be
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done. This follows from the observation that in the complete bipartite graph ([n] ∪ [m], [n] × [m]) with
weight of edge (i, g) set to log (vi(g) + ℓi), the weight of the matching (i, ĝi)i is a 4n approximation to
the optimal Nash social welfare by equation (2) and, hence, the same guarantee holds for a maximum-
weight matching in the graph. Condition (ii) ensures that each agent also receives at least ℓi after the
initial assignment of the nmatched goods.
For additive valuations, both conditions (i) and (ii) can be satisfied. This template was employed in
the SMatch algorithm (for additive valuations) of Garg et al. [GKK20]. However, for submodular (and
subadditive) valuations, the quantity ℓi is hard to approximate within a sub-linear factor [SF11].
Therefore, instead of satisfying condition (i) explicitly, we maintain an upper bound γi ≥ ℓi for each
agent i. Our algorithm first obtains a maximum weight matching in the bipartite graph between agents
and goods with the weight of edge (i, g) ∈ [n]× [m] set to log(vi(g)+γi). It assigns all the matched goods
to the respective agents, removes these goods from further consideration in this iteration, and then
carries out a procedure (described below) to ensure condition (ii). If, for agent i, the bundle obtained in
this procedure (i.e., the bundle obtained for i after removing the matched goods) has value less than γi,
then we multiplicatively reduce the (over) estimate γi for i and repeat the algorithm.
The procedure towards satisfying condition (ii) consists of two steps. Let G be the set of goods that
remain once we remove the matched n goods from [m]. In the first step, if there exists an agent i and a
good g ∈ G such that vi(g) ≥ vi(G)/(2n), we assign g to i and remove both from further consideration.
An agent thus removed has value ℓi from the assigned good; note that, by definition, ℓi ≤ vi(G)/(2n).
After this step, we observe that vi(g) ≤ vi(G)/(2n) for each remaining agent i and good g. In the
second step, we run a moving knife subroutine (Algorithm 2) on the goods that are still unassigned. In
this subroutine, the goods are initially ordered in an arbitrary fashion. A hypothetical knife is then
moved across the goods from one side until an agent i (who has yet to receive a bundle) calls out that
the goods covered so far have a collective value of at least vi(G)/(2n) for her. These covered goods
are then allocated to said agent i and both the agent as well as this bundle is removed from further
consideration. We show that this allocation satisfies condition (ii), i.e., the bundle assigned to each agent
in this procedure has value at least ℓi (but it may be lower than the overestimate γi).
Since we can guarantee ℓi for each agent i, irrespective of which goods are removed in the matching
step, γi never goes below ℓi, for any agent. Hence, at some point, every agent i receives a bundle of
value at least γi in the above two steps. We show that these bundles, with the goods matched with each
agent, provide an 8n approximation to the optimal Nash social welfare.
It is relevant to note we use ℓi solely for the purposes of analysis. Our algorithm executes with the
overestimate γi and keeps reducing this value till it is realized (in the two-step procedure) for all the
agents.
As mentioned previously, the SMatch algorithm (developed for additive valuations) of Garg et
al. [GKK20] relies of conditions (i) and (ii). However, for submodular valuations their work diverges
considerably from the current approach. In particular, the RepReMatch algorithm (developed for sub-
modular valuations) in [GKK20] first finds a set of goods G with the property that in the bipartite graph
between all the agents and G, there is a matching wherein every agent is matched to a good with value
at least as much as her highest valued good in N∗i . To ensure this property the cardinality of G needs to
be n log n. Intuitively, this requirement leads to a lower bound of Ω(n log n) on the approximation ratio
obtained in [GKK20]. Furthermore, the steps in their algorithm to ensure condition (ii) do not extend
to subadditive valuations either. Specifically, Garg et al. [GKK19] note that their algorithm gives an
approximation ratio of Ω(m) for the case of subadditive valuations. The 2n-approximation of Khot and
Ponnuswami for egalitarian welfare [KP07] first guesses the optimal egalitarian welfare b, and uses this
to partition the goods into “large” ones (those with value higher than b/n) and “small” ones, for each
agent. It then tries to ensure every agent receives a bundle with valuation at least b/n. For Nash social
welfare, guessing just a single value does not appear to help, since the Nash social welfare depends on
the valuation of each agent.
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The following theorem constitutes our main result for Nash social welfare.
Theorem 2. Let I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉 be a fair division instance in which the valuation function vi, of each
agent i ∈ [n], is nonnegative, monotone, and subadditive. Given value oracle access to vis, the algorithm ALG
computes an 8n approximation to the Nash optimal allocation in polynomial time.
Algorithm 2 MOVINGKNIFE
Input: Instance J = 〈G,A, {vi}i∈A〉with value oracle access to the valuation functions vis
Output: An allocation P = (P1, P2, . . . , P|A|)
1: Initialize S = ∅, Ĝ = G, Â = A, and bundle Pi = ∅ for all i ∈ A.
2: while Ĝ 6= ∅ and Â 6= ∅ do
3: Select any arbitrary good g ∈ Ĝ and update S ← S ∪ {g} along with Ĝ← Ĝ \ {g}.
4: if for some agent â ∈ Â we have vâ(S) ≥ 12nvâ(G) then
5: Set Pâ = S and update Â← Â \ {â} along with S ← ∅.
6: end if
7: end while
8: if Ĝ 6= ∅ then
9: P|A| ← P|A| ∪ Ĝ
10: end if
11: return allocation P = (P1, . . . , P|A|).
The following lemma proves inequality (2). We state and prove it for an arbitrary allocation A∗ =
(A∗1, . . . , A
∗
n), rather than just for the Nash optimal allocation.
Lemma 3. Let I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}i〉 be a fair division instance with monotone, subadditive valuations and let
A∗ = (A∗1, . . . , A∗n) be any allocation in I . Let ĝi be the most valued (by i) good inA∗i (i.e., ĝi := argmaxg∈A∗i vi(g))
and ℓi be as defined in (1). Then, for each agent i ∈ [n]
vi(ĝi) + ℓi ≥ 1
4n
vi(A
∗
i ).
Proof Consider any agent i ∈ [n] and note that ℓi ≥ 0. We will establish the lemma by considering two
complementary cases.
Case I: There exists a good gi ∈ A∗i with the property that vi(gi) ≥ 14nvi(A∗i ). Since ĝi is the most valued
good in N∗i , we have vi(ĝi) ≥ vi(gi) and the desired inequality follows.
Case II: For all goods g ∈ A∗i , vi(g) < 14nvi(A∗i ). Recall that ℓi := minS⊂[m],|S|≤2n
1
2nvi([m] \ S). Let S∗ be the
set S that induces ℓi, i.e., ℓi =
1
2nvi([m] \ S∗). Monotonicity of vi ensures that |S∗| = 2n and
ℓi =
1
2n
vi([m] \ S∗) ≥ 1
2n
vi(A
∗
i \ S∗) . (3)
Furthermore, given that in the current case vi(g) <
1
4nvi(A
∗
i ) for all g ∈ A∗i , we have
vi(A
∗
i ∩ S∗) ≤
∑
g∈A∗i∩S
∗
vi(g) <
∑
g∈A∗i∩S
∗
1
4n
vi(A
∗
i ) ≤
|S∗|
4n
vi(A
∗
i ) =
1
2
vi(A
∗
i ) . (4)
Here, the first inequality follows from the fact that vi is subadditive and the last since |S∗| = 2n.
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Therefore, we obtain the desired bound in terms of ℓi:
ℓi ≥ 1
2n
vi(A
∗
i \ S∗) (via inequality (3))
≥ 1
2n
(vi(A
∗
i )− vi(A∗i ∩ S∗)) (vi is subadditive)
≥ 1
4n
vi(A
∗
i ) (via inequality (4))
Thus, the the stated inequality vi(ĝi) + ℓi ≥ 14nvi(A∗i ) holds even in this case. ⊓⊔
The next lemma establishes the key property of Algorithm 2 (MOVINGKNIFE): if all the goods have
low value for every agent, then MOVINGKNIFE returns a near-proportional allocation.
Lemma 4. Consider a fair division instance 〈G,A, {vi}i∈A〉 wherein the agents have monotone, subadditive
valuations. In addition, suppose for each agent i ∈ A and good g ∈ G we have vi(g) < 12nvi(G), where n ≥ |A|.
Then the allocation (P1, . . . , P|A|) returned by Algorithm 2 (MOVINGKNIFE) satisfies vi(Pi) ≥ 12nvi(G) for all
i ∈ A.
Proof Given instance 〈G,A, {vi}i∈A〉, the MOVINGKNIFE algorithm (Algorithm 2) considers the goods
in an arbitrary order and adds these goods one by one into a bundle S until an agent â calls out that its
value for S is at least 12nvâ(G). We assign these goods to agent â and remove them—along with â—from
consideration. The algorithm iterates over the remaining set of agents and goods. We will show that the
while loop in the MOVINGKNIFE algorithm terminates with Â = ∅ and, hence, assigns to each agent a
bundle of desired value.
Consider an integer (count) k ∈ N. Let Ĝ and Â denote the set of goods and agents, respectively, that
are left unassigned after k agents are assigned bundles in MOVINGKNIFE; note that |Â| = |A| − k. The
arguments below establish that for each remaining agent i ∈ Â,
vi(Ĝ) ≥
(
1− k
n
)
vi(G) (5)
Therefore, for any k < |A| ≤ n, the set of unassigned goods Ĝ is nonempty and even the last agent
(i.e., with k = |A| − 1) receives a bundle of sufficiently high value.
To prove (5), consider any agent i ∈ Â. Indeed, agent i has not received any goods yet, but the k
agents in A \ Â have been assigned bundles. Let S be a bundle assigned to some agent in A \ Â (i.e.,
Pj = S for some j ∈ A \ Â) and g′ be the last good included in S. Step 4 of the algorithm ensures
that vi(S \ {g′}) < 12nvi(G); otherwise, S \ {g′} would have been assigned to agent i. Furthermore, the
assumption (in the Lemma statement) gives us vi(g
′) ≤ 12nvi(G). Hence, using these inequalities and the
subadditivity of vi, we get vi(S) ≤ vi(S \ {g′}) + vi(g′) ≤ 1nvi(G).
This inequality provides an upper bound on vi(G \ Ĝ) = vi
(
∪
j∈A\Â
Pj
)
, the total value of the set of
goods assigned among the k agents in A \ Â. Specifically, by the subadditivity of vi, vi(G \ Ĝ) ≤ knvi(G).
Therefore, vi(Ĝ) ≥ vi(G)− vi(G \ Ĝ) ≥
(
1− kn
)
vi(G).
Overall, every agent i ∈ A is eventually assigned a bundle of value at least 12nvi(G) in the while
loop. ⊓⊔
Next we show that in each iteration of the while loop in ALG (Algorithm 1), the value of the assigned
bundle Bti is at least as large as ℓi.
Lemma 5. Given a fair division instance I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}i〉 with subadditive valuations, let Bti be the bundle
assigned to agent i ∈ [n] in the tth iteration (for t ∈ N) of the outer while loop (Step 10) in ALG. Then, for all
agents i ∈ [n] and each iteration count t, we have vi(Bti ) ≥ ℓi.
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Proof During any iteration t of the outer while loop (Step 10) in ALG and for any agent i ∈ [n], the
bundleBti either consists of a single good of high value (Step 15), or of the set of goods assigned to agent
i obtained after executing the MOVINGKNIFE subroutine (Step 17). We will show that in both cases the
stated inequality holds.
Recall that ℓi := min
S⊂[m]:|S|≤2n
1
2n vi ([m] \ S). Equivalently, ℓi = min
T⊂[m]:|T |≥m−2n
1
2nvi(T ). Therefore, we
have
1
2n
vi(T ) ≥ ℓi for any subset T ⊂ [m] of size at least (m− 2n) (6)
The relevant observation here is that, in any iteration t, the set of goods G from which the bundles
Btis are populated satisfies |G| ≥ m − 2n. Specifically, in the tth iteration, we start with |G| = m − n
(Step 13). Subsequently, the inner while loop (Step 14) assigns at most n goods and, hence, the number
of goods passed on to the MOVINGKNIFE subroutine satisfies |G| ≥ m− 2n.
First, we note that the lemma holds for any agent a′ that receive a singleton bundle Bta′ = {g′} in
Step 15: va′(g
′) ≥ 12nva′(G) ≥ ℓa′ . Here, the first inequality follows from the selection criterion applied
to g′ and the second inequality from equation (6) and the fact that |G| ≥ m− 2n.
Finally, we note that the bound also holds for the remaining agents i that receive a bundleBti through
the MOVINGKNIFE subroutine. As mentioned previously, at least m− 2n goods are passed on as input
to the subroutine, i.e., if MOVINGKNIFE is executed on instance J = 〈G,A, {vi}i∈A〉, then we have
|G| ≥ m− 2n. Inequality (6) ensures that 12nvi(G) ≥ ℓi for all i ∈ A. Finally, using Lemma 4, we get that
the bundle assigned to agent i ∈ A satisfies the stated inequality: vi(Bti ) = vi(Pi) ≥ 12nvi(G) ≥ ℓi.
Hence, the stated claim follows. ⊓⊔
We now show that the estimates γtis used in ALG also satisfy a lower bound similar to that in
Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. Given a fair division instance I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}i〉 with subadditive valuations, let γti ∈ R+ be the
estimate associated with agent i ∈ [n] in the tth iteration (for t ∈ N) of the outer while loop (Step 10) in ALG.
Then, for all agents i ∈ [n] and each iteration count t, we have γti ≥
(
1− 1m
)
ℓi.
Proof Note that for any agent i ∈ [n], the quantity ℓi = 0 iff i has positive value for at most 2n goods.
This observation implies that the initial for loop in ALG correctly identifies agents i that have ℓi = 0, and
sets γ0i = 0. For such agents γ
t
i = 0 for all t. Hence, the lemma holds for any agent iwith ℓi = 0.
We now consider agents i ∈ [n] with ℓi > 0. For such an agent i, the algorithm initially sets γ0i =
vi([m]). Hence, for t = 0 we have γ
t
i ≥
(
1− 1m
)
ℓi. An inductive argument shows that this inequality
continues to hold as the algorithm progresses. In particular, if in the tth iteration the algorithm does not
decrement the estimate (i.e., if i ∈ SATt+1), then γt+1i = γti ≥
(
1− 1m
)
ℓi.
Even otherwise, if the algorithm multiplicatively decrements the estimate (in particular, sets γt+1i =
(1− 1/m) γti ), then it must be the case that γti > vi(Bti) (i.e., i ∈ UNSATt+1). That is, after the decrement
we have γt+1i ≥
(
1− 1m
)
vi(B
t
i) ≥
(
1− 1m
)
ℓi; the last inequality follows from Lemma 5. This completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
3.1 Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we prove Theorem 2 by showing that ALG runs in polynomial time (Lemma 7) and the
computed allocation achieves the stated approximation ratio of 8n (Lemma 8).
Lemma 7 (Runtime Analysis). Given any fair division instance I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}i〉 in which the agents have
monotone, subadditive valuations, ALG (Algorithm 1) terminates after T = O (nm log (nmV )) iterations of its
outer while loop (Step 10); here, V = max
i∈[n]
(
max
g∈[m]
vi(g)
min
g∈[m]:vi(g)>0
vi(g)
)
.
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Proof By design, ALG iterates as long as UNSATt 6= ∅. We will bound the number of times (i.e., the
distinct values of t for which) any agent i ∈ [n] is contained in UNSATt and, hence, establish the stated
runtime bound.
Recall that for any agent i ∈ [n], the quantity ℓi = 0 iff i has positive value for at most 2n goods. For
such agents ALG sets γ0i = 0. Therefore, these agents are contained in SATt, for all iterations t ≥ 1, and
do not contribute to the repetitions of the outer while loop.
For the remaining agents, with ℓi > 0, the algorithm initially sets γ
0
i = vi([m]) and we have
ℓi ≥ 1
2n
min
g∈[m]:vi(g)>0
vi(g) . (7)
Using Lemma 6 and the fact that the algorithm decrements γti by a multiplicative factor of (1− 1/m)
whenever i ∈ UNSATt, we get that the number of times agent i can be in the UNSATt is at most
m log
(
vi([m])
ℓi
)
≤ m log
(
m maxg∈[m] vi(g)
ℓi
)
(since vi is subadditive, vi([m]) ≤ mmaxg∈[m] vi(g))
≤ m log
2nm maxg∈[m] vi(g)
min
g∈[m]:vi(g)>0
vi(g)
 (via inequality (7))
≤ m log (2nmV ) .
Summing over all agents, we get that the number of timesUNSATt 6= ∅ is at most T = O (nm log (nmV )).
Hence, the stated lemma follows. ⊓⊔
We now show that the allocation computed by ALG achieves the required approximation guarantee.
Lemma 8 (Approximation Guarantee). For any given fair division instance I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉 with
subadditive valuations, let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) denote the allocation computed by ALG. Then, NSW(B) ≥
1
8nNSW(N ∗); here, N ∗ denotes the Nash optimal allocation in I .
Proof For the given instance I , say ALG terminates after T + 1 iterations of the outer while loop. That
is, we have UNSATT+1 = ∅ and, for each agent i ∈ [n], the returned bundle Bi = BTi ∪ {πT (i)}. Here,
πT (i) is the good assigned to agent i under the maximum weight matching πT (considered in the last
iteration) and BTi is the bundle populated for i (either in Step 15 or in Step 17).
The fact that UNSATT+1 = ∅ (i.e., SATT+1 = [n]) gives us
vi(B
T
i ) ≥ γTi for all i ∈ [n] . (8)
Lemma 3 (instantiated with A∗ = N ∗) implies that there exists a matching—σ(i) := ĝi ∈ N∗i , for all
i ∈ [n]—with the property that vi(σ(i)) + ℓi ≥ 14nvi(N∗i ). Using this inequality and Lemma 6 we get, for
all i ∈ [n]:
vi(σ(i)) + γ
T
i ≥
(
1− 1
m
)
1
4n
vi(N
∗
i ) . (9)
Recall that πT is a maximum weight matching in the bipartite graph (considered in Step 11 of ALG)
with edge weights log
(
vi(g) + γ
T
i
)
. Given that σ(·) is somematching in the graph and πT is a maximum
weight matching, we get
∑n
i=1 log
(
vi(π
T (i)) + γTi
) ≥∑ni=1 log (vi(σ(i)) + γTi ). That is,(
n∏
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + γTi
)) 1n ≥ ( n∏
i=1
(
vi(σ(i)) + γ
T
i
)) 1n ≥ (1− 1
m
)
1
4n
NSW(N ∗) . (10)
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The last inequality follows from equation (9). Also, as defined previously, the optimal Nash social
welfare NSW(N ∗) = (∏ni vi (N∗i ))1/n.
The monotonicity of the valuation function vi implies vi
({πT (i)} ∪BTi ) ≥ 1/2 (vi(πT (i)) + vi(BTi ))
for each i ∈ [n]. Using these observations we can lower bound the Nash social welfare of the computed
allocation
(
Bi = {πT (i)} ∪BTi
)
i
as follows(
n∏
i=1
vi(Bi)
) 1
n
≥ 1
2
(
n∏
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + vi(B
T
i )
)) 1n
≥ 1
2
(
n∏
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + γTi
)) 1n
(via inequality (8))
≥
(
1− 1
m
)
1
8n
NSW(N ∗) . (via inequality (10))
This establishes the stated approximation guarantee and completes the proof of the lemma. ⊓⊔
Remark: The result of Garg et al. [GKK20] also holds for an asymmetric version of Nash social welfare
maximization, in which each agent i has an associated weight ηi ≥ 0 and the goal is to find an alloca-
tion (A1, . . . , An) that maximizes
(∏
i∈[n] (vi(Ai))
ηi
) 1∑
i∈[n] ηi . Our approximation guarantee extends to
this formulation. In particular, in Step 11 of ALG we can set the edges weights to be ηi log(vi(g) + γi)
(instead of log(vi(g) + γi)) and note that the subsequent arguments follow through to provide an 8n-
approximation ratio for maximizing Nash social welfare with asymmetric agents and subadditive valu-
ations.
Also, one can use Theorem 2, in conjunction with the m/n approximation guarantee of Nguyen
and Rothe [NR14],4 to obtain an O(
√
m)-approximation algorithm for maximizing Nash social welfare
under subadditive valuations: for instances in whichm ≥ n2, the 8n approximation suffices. Otherwise,
ifm < n2 (i.e.,m/n <
√
m), then we can invoke the result of Nguyen and Rothe [NR14].
4 An 8n-Approximation for p-Mean Welfare
This section shows that we can extend Algorithm 1 and obtain an 8n approximation for maximizing the
p-mean welfare as well.
For maximizing p-mean welfare, ALG (Algorithm 1) is modified as follows: In Step 11, the weight
w(i, g) of edge (i, g) ∈ [n]× [m] is set as (vi(g) + γti )p (instead of log
(
vi(g) + γ
t
i
)
).5 Furthermore,
(i) For p ∈ (0, 1], in Step 12 we compute a left-perfect maximum-weight matching, πt, otherwise
(ii) For finite p < 0, we compute a left-perfect minimum-weight matching, πt, in Step 12
(iii) For maximizing egalitarian welfare (the p = −∞ case), we set edge weights to be (vi(g) + γti) and
compute a max-min matching6 πt with respect to these weights.
Theorem 9 below establishes that, with these changes in ALG (Algorithm 1), we can efficiently com-
pute an allocation with p-mean welfare at least 18n times the optimal (p-mean welfare). Note that by
Proposition 1, for p ≤ −n log n, we can maximize the egalitarian welfare, instead of the p-mean welfare,
and the allocation thus obtained is an 8n-approximation to the optimal p-mean welfare allocation.
4While Theorem 4 in [NR14] provides the above-mentioned approximation guarantee of (m − n + 1), its proof can in fact
be easily modified to obtain an approximation ratio ofm/n.
5Recall that the p = 0 case corresponds to Nash social welfare. Since we already have the desired approximation guarantee
for this case, it is not explicitly addressed in this section.
6In particular, via binary search (over edge weights), we find a matching wherein the minimum edgeweight (across agents)
is as high as possible.
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Theorem 9. Let I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉 be a fair division instance in which the valuation function vi, of each
agent i ∈ [n], is nonnegative, monotone, and subadditive. Then, given value oracle access to vis , one can efficiently
compute an 8n approximation to the optimal p-mean welfare for any p ∈ (−∞, 1].
Proof We first note that Lemmas 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 hold as is for p-mean welfare. In particular, using
Lemma 7 we get that, even with the above-mentioned changes, the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
To complete the proof of the theorem,wewill next show that the computed allocation B = (B1, . . . , Bn)
satisfiesMp(B) ≥ 18nMp(A∗(p)), whereA∗(p) is a p-mean welfare maximizing allocation.
For the given instance I , say the modified algorithm terminates after T + 1 iterations of the outer
while loop. That is, we have UNSATT+1 = ∅ and, for each agent i ∈ [n], the returned bundle Bi =
BTi ∪ {πT (i)}. Here, πT (i) is the good assigned to agent i under the matching πT (considered in the last
iteration) and BTi is the bundle populated for i in the final iteration.
The fact that UNSATT+1 = ∅ (i.e., SATT+1 = [n]) gives us
vi(B
T
i ) ≥ γTi for all i ∈ [n] (11)
Lemma 3 implies that there exists a matching—σ(i) := ĝi ∈ A∗i (p), for all i ∈ [n]—with the property
that vi(σ(i)) + ℓi ≥ 14nvi(A∗i (p)). Using this inequality and Lemma 6 we get, for all i ∈ [n]:
vi(σ(i)) + γ
T
i ≥
(
1− 1
m
)
1
4n
vi(A
∗
i (p)) (12)
Recall that, given p, the modified algorithm computes πT based on the sign of p. Hence, we split the
proof of Theorem 9 into three cases depending on whether p > 0, p < 0, or p = −∞.
Case (i): p > 0. In this case, πT is a left-perfect maximum-weight matching in the bipartite graph
([n]∪[m], [n]×[m])with edgeweights (vi(g) + γTi )p. Given that σ(·) is some (left-perfect) matching in the
graph and πT is a maximum-weight matching, we get
∑n
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + γTi
)p ≥∑ni=1 (vi(σ(i)) + γTi )p.
Therefore, with p > 0, the following inequality holds(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + γTi
)p) 1p ≥ ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
vi(σ(i)) + γ
T
i
)p) 1p ≥ (1− 1
m
)
1
4n
Mp(A∗(p)) . (13)
The last inequality follows from (12).
Case (ii): Finite p < 0. By design, in this case, πT is a left-perfect minimum-weight matching in the
bipartite graph ([n] ∪ [m], [n] × [m]) with edge weights (vi(g) + γTi )p. Given that σ(·) is some left-
perfect matching in the graph and πT is a minimum-weight matching, we get
∑n
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + γTi
)p ≤∑n
i=1
(
vi(σ(i)) + γ
T
i
)p
. The fact that p is negative gives us(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + γTi
)p) 1p ≥ ( 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
vi(σ(i)) + γ
T
i
)p) 1p ≥ (1− 1
m
)
1
4n
Mp(A∗(p)) (14)
The last inequality follows from (12).
Case (iii): p = −∞. In this case, πT is amax-minmatching computedwith edgeweights (vi(πT (i)) + γTi ).
Given that σ(·) is some matching in the graph and matching πT maximizes the value of the minimum
matched edge, we getmini∈[n](vi(π
T (i)) + γTi ) ≥ mini∈[n](vi(σT (i)) + γTi ). Therefore,
min
i∈[n]
(vi(π
T (i)) + γTi ) ≥ min
i∈[n]
(vi(σ
T (i)) + γTi ) ≥
(
1− 1
m
)
1
4n
Mp(A∗(p)) (15)
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The last inequality follows from (12).
The monotonicity of the valuation function vi implies vi
({πT (i)} ∪BTi ) ≥ 1/2 (vi(πT (i)) + vi(BTi ))
for each i ∈ [n]. Using these observations we can lower bound the p-mean welfare of the computed
allocation
(
Bi = {πT (i)} ∪BTi
)
i
as follows(
n∑
i=1
(vi(Bi))
p
) 1
p
≥ 1
2
(
n∑
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + vi(B
T
i )
)p) 1p
≥ 1
2
(
n∑
i=1
(
vi(π
T (i)) + γTi
)p) 1p
(via inequality (11))
≥
(
1− 1
m
)
1
8n
Mp(A∗(p)) (via inequality (13), (14), or (15))
This establishes the stated approximation guarantee and completes the proof of the theorem. ⊓⊔
5 Lower Bound on Approximating p-Mean Welfare
This section shows that, under XOS valuations, maximizing the p-mean welfare for p ∈ (−∞, 1] within
a sub-linear (in n) approximation factor necessarily requires an exponential number of value queries
(Theorem 10). This result directly implies that the approximation ratio obtained in Theorems 2 and
9 (via polynomially many value queries) is essentially tight. We note that this query lower bound is
unconditional, i.e., it does not depend on any complexity theoretic assumption.
We establish Theorem 10 by directly adapting a result of Dobzinski et al. [DNS10], which provides
a similar lower bound for social welfare. The impossibility result here holds under XOS valuations; 7
recall that XOS valuations constitute a special class of subadditive functions.
Theorem 10. For fair division instances I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}i〉 with XOS valuations and p ∈ (−∞, 1], finding an
allocation with p-mean welfare at least 1/n1−ε times the optimal requires exponentially many value queries; here
ε > 0 is any fixed constant.
Here, we briefly explain the salient points of the proof of this lower bound and provide the details
in Appendix A.2. Dobzinski et al. [DNS10] construct two (families of) instances, both with n agents,
m = n2 goods, and XOS valuations for the agents. In the first instance, each agent has the same valuation
function f : 2[m] 7→ R+ andmaximum average social welfare (1-mean welfare) is n4δ, for a fixed constant
δ > 0. In the second instance, each agent has her own (non-identical) valuation function vi : 2
[m] 7→ R+
and there exists an allocation in which each agent has value n for her bundle. For any p ≤ 1, it follows
that in the first instance the optimal p-mean welfare is at most n4δ (via the generalized mean inequality),
while for the second instance, the optimal p-mean welfare is at least n (since there exists an allocation
where every agent achieves value n). The proof of Dobzinski et al. [DNS10] goes on to show that it takes
an exponential number of value queries to distinguish between the two instances. However, given an
O(n1−ε)-approximation algorithm for the p-mean welfare, one can readily distinguish between the two
instances (by choosing δ < ε/4). Hence such an algorithm must make an exponential number of value
queries.
6 (m− n+ 1)-Approximation Guarantees
This section provides two extensions of the result of Nguyen and Rothe [NR14], which shows the
Nash social welfare maximization problem (under subadditive valuations) admits an (m − n + 1)-
7Our results work under the value oracle model and do not require an explicit description of the underlying additive
functions that define the XOS function at hand.
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approximation algorithm. First, we show that an (m − n + 1)-approximation for the p-mean welfare
can be obtained for all p ≤ 0 and with subadditive valuations. Then, we establish that it is NP-hard to
extend this positive result to any p ∈ (0, 1), even under additive valuations, i.e., it is NP-hard to obtain
an (m − n + 1)-approximation for 0 < p < 1. The proofs of these two results are deferred to Appendix
A.3.
Theorem 11. Let I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉 be a fair division instance in which the valuation function vi, of each
agent i ∈ [n], is nonnegative, monotone, and subadditive. Then, given value oracle access to vis, one can efficiently
compute an (m− n+ 1) approximation to the p-mean welfare maximization problem for any p ∈ (−∞, 0].
The next theorem asserts that it is unlikely that Theorem 11 extends to p ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 12. For fair division instances I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉 with additive valuations and for any fixed
p ∈ (0, 1), computing an allocation with p-mean welfare at least 1/(m − n+ 1)-times the optimal (for allm and
n) is NP-hard.
Note that this hardness result (in light of Theorem 9) is relevant for instances in which m < 2n. We
can also show that when agents have submodular valuations, it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal
social welfare (the p = 1 case) by a factor better than ee−1(m− n+1). This inapproximability is obtained
via a reduction from the hardness result of Khot et al. [KLMM08]. We defer the details to a full version
of the paper.
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A Appendix
A.1 Missing Proof from Section 2
This section restates and proves Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For any n nonnegative numbers x1, . . . , xn ∈ R+ and p ≤ −n log n, we have
M−∞(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ Mp(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ 21/n M−∞(x1, . . . , xn) .
Proof The first inequality M−∞(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ Mp(x1, . . . , xn) is an instantiation of the generalized
mean inequality. For the second bound Mp(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ 21/n M−∞(x1, . . . , xn), we assume, with-
out loss of generality, that x1 = mini xi. Note that (xi/x1)
p ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and, hence, we have(
1 +
(
x2
x1
)p
+ . . . +
(
xn
x1
)p)
≥ 1. Therefore, the fact that p is negative gives us
(
1 +
(
x2
x1
)p
+ . . .+
(
xn
x1
)p)1/p
≤ 11/p = 1 (16)
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This inequality leads to the stated upper bound
Mp(x1, . . . , xn) =
(
1
n
(xp1 + . . .+ x
p
n)
)1/p
=
x1
n1/p
(
1 +
(
x2
x1
)p
+ . . .+
(
xn
x1
)p)1/p
≤ x1
n1/p
(from equation (16))
≤ x1 n1/(n logn) (since p ≤ −n log n)
= 21/nx1 = 2
1/nM−∞(x1, . . . , xn) .
⊓⊔
A.2 Missing Proofs from Section 5
Here we establish Theorem 10.
Theorem 10. For fair division instances I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}i〉 with XOS valuations and p ∈ (−∞, 1], finding an
allocation with p-mean welfare at least 1/n1−ε times the optimal requires exponentially many value queries; here
ε > 0 is any fixed constant.
Proof Consider a family of instances with n agents and m = n2 goods. In addition, for a subset of
goods S ⊂ [m], define an additive function aS(·) as follows: aS(g) := 1 if g ∈ S, otherwise (if g /∈ S) we
have aS(g) := 0. That is, aS(T ) = |S ∩ T | for all T ⊂ [m]. Furthermore, for an arbitrarily small constant
δ > 0, define the additive function a(·) as a(g) := 1+δ
n1−2δ
for each good g ∈ [m].
We now construct an XOS function
f(T ) := max
{
max
S⊂[m]:|S|≤(1+δ)n4δ
aS(T ), a(T )
}
for all T ⊂ [m] (17)
For any subset of goods T , if |T | ≤ (1 + δ)n4δ , then we have f(T ) = aT (T ) = |T |. This equality
follows from the fact that, in this cardinality range, aT (T ) is strictly greater than a(T ). Also, note that for
sets of size more than (1+ δ)n4δ , the values of the additive functions {aS}S considered in (17) plateau at
(1 + δ)n4δ . However, it is only when |T | > n1+2δ, that the term a(T ) dominates aS(T ).
Using function f , we define an XOS valuation vi for each agent i ∈ [n]. Select a partition T1, . . . , Tn of
them = n2 goods uniformly at random such that |Ti| = n for each i ∈ [n]. Then, valuation vi is defined
as follows
vi(T ) := max {f(T ), aTi(T )} for all T ⊂ [m] (18)
To prove the stated query lower bound, we consider two families of instances. One in which the
valuation of each agent is f and the other in which the agents’ valuations are vis. In Claim 1 below we
prove that an exponential number of value queries are required to differentiate between these two cases,
i.e., to determine whether an agent i’s valuation is f or vi.
However, this distinction can be made via an n1−ε approximation to the optimal p-mean welfare: if
the valuation of each agent is f , then the maximum average social welfare (1-mean welfare) is O
(
n4δ
)
and, hence, by monotonicity of p-mean welfare (with p ≤ 1) we get that the optimal p-mean welfare is
alsoO
(
n4δ
)
in this case. By contrast, when the valuation functions are vis, by assigning subset Ti to each
agent i, we can ensure that each agent receives a bundle of value n. That is, in this setting, the optimal
p-mean welfare is equal to n. This gap between the optimal p-mean welfare in the two cases implies that,
with a sub-linear approximation in hand, one can distinguish between f and vi. However, the following
claim shows that this task requires an exponential number of value queries.
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Claim 1. An exponential number of value queries are required to distinguish whether an agent i’s valuation is f
or vi.
Proof We will prove that, for any subset S ⊂ [m], the inequality vi(S) 6= f(S) holds with exponentially
small probability.8 Hence, an exponential number of value queries are required to distinguish between
these two functions.
Note that, for a subset S, vi(S) 6= f(S) iff aTi(S) > f(S) (see (18)). The following cases identify
conditions (on subsets S) under which we have aTi(S) > f(S).
Case 1: |S| ≤ (1 + δ)n4δ . For subsets with this small a cardinality, functions vi and f have the same
value. In particular, if |S| ≤ (1 + δ)n4δ , then f(S) = |S| ≥ |S ∩ Ti| = aTi(S) and, hence, the equality
vi(S) = f(S) holds.
Case 2: (1 + δ)n4δ < |S| ≤ n1+2δ. As observed previously, in this cardinality range, f(S) = (1 + δ)n4δ .
Therefore, for the inequality aTi(S) > f(S) to hold, we require aTi(S) = |S ∩ Ti| > (1 + δ)n4δ .
Since the partition T1, . . . , Tn of [m] (with m = n
2 and |Tj | = n for each j) was chosen uniformly at
random, we have E [|S ∩ Ti|] = |S|/n ≤ n4δ. ApplyingChernoff bounds,we getPr
{|S ∩ Ti| ≥ (1 + δ)n4δ} ≤
exp
(
−n4δδ23
)
. Therefore, in this case, vi(S) 6= f(S)with exponentially small probability.
Case 3: |S| > n1+2δ. Here, f(S) = a(S) = (1+δ)
n1−2δ
|S| (see equation (17)). Therefore, the inequality aTi(S) >
f(S) holds iff |S∩Ti| > (1+δ) |S|n1−2δ . Again, via Chernoff bound, we get thatPr
{
|S ∩ Ti| > (1 + δ) |S|n1−2δ
}
is exponentially small.
Overall, these observations show that, irrespective of the size of the S, the separation vi(S) 6= f(S)
holds with exponentially small probability. This establishes the claim. ⊓⊔
As mentioned previously, Claim 1 implies that an exponential number of value queries are required
to approximate the maximum p-mean welfare within a factor of n1−ε. ⊓⊔
A.3 Missing Proofs from Section 6
In this section we restate and prove Theorems 11 and 12.
Theorem 11. Let I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉 be a fair division instance in which the valuation function vi, of each
agent i ∈ [n], is nonnegative, monotone, and subadditive. Then, given value oracle access to vis, one can efficiently
compute an (m− n+ 1) approximation to the p-mean welfare maximization problem for any p ∈ (−∞, 0].
Proof We actually show that an optimal matching achieves the stated approximation bound. Consider
the bipartite graph
(
[n] ∪ [m], [n]× [m], {w(i, g)}i∈[n],g∈[m]
)
with weight of edge (i, g) ∈ [n] × [m] set
as w(i, g) = (vi(g))
p (for p = 0, we set the weight to be log vi(g)). Compute a left-perfect minimum-
weight matching, π, in this bipartite graph. Assign the remaining items arbitrarily to the agents and let
P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be the resulting allocation. We will show that P obtains the required approximation
ratio.
For the given p ≤ 0, let A∗ = (A∗1, . . . , A∗n) denote a p-mean welfare maximizing allocation. Since
p ≤ 0, in allocation A∗ each agent is allocated at least one good (otherwise the optimal value is zero).
Hence, any agent is allocated at most m − n + 1 goods, |A∗i | ≤ m − n + 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Let g∗i be the
highest valued (by i) good in A∗i , i.e., g
∗
i = argmaxg∈A∗i vi(g). Then, the subadditivity of vi implies that
vi(g
∗
i ) ≥
1
m− n+ 1vi(N
∗
i ) . (19)
8Recall that the partition T1, . . . , Tn of them goods is selected at random.
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Further, since allocating g∗i to agent i constitutes a feasible matching of the goods to agents and π is a
minimum-weight matching, we have
∑
i∈[n] vi(π(i))
p ≤ ∑i∈[n] vi(g∗i )p. The fact that p is negative gives
us (
∑
i vi(π(i))
p)1/p ≥ (∑i vi(g∗i )p)1/p. Hence,
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(vi(Pi))
p
1/p ≥
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(vi(π(i)))
p
1/p ≥
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(vi(g
∗
i ))
p
1/p ≥ 1
m− n+ 1
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(vi(N
∗
i ))
p
1/p .
The last inequality follows from equation (19). This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Theorem 12. For fair division instances I = 〈[m], [n], {vi}ni=1〉 with additive valuations and for any fixed
p ∈ (0, 1), computing an allocation with p-mean welfare at least 1/(m − n+ 1)-times the optimal (for allm and
n) is NP-hard.
Proof Our reduction is from the PARTITION problem: given a set S = {si ∈ Z+}mi=1 of m positive
integers, determine if there exists a subset T ⊆ [m] of indices such that∑i∈T si = 12∑i∈[m] si. PARTITION
is one of the classic NP-hard problems.
Given an instance of PARTITION, we construct a fair division instance with additive valuations as
follows. Write z :=
∑
i∈[m] si and consider n = m agents and m goods, g1, . . . , gm. The first two agents
have value si for good gi, for each i ∈ [m]; hence, these two agents have identical additive valuations.
The remaining m− 2 agents have value 0 for all goods.9 Note that in this instance, since the number of
goods and number of agents is equal, an (m − n + 1)-approximation algorithm must in fact return an
allocation with maximum p-mean welfare.
We now claim that there is an allocation of p-mean welfare
(
2
m
) 1
p z
2 iff the underlying PARTITION
instance has the required set T . Suppose that there exists such a set T . Then, we can assign all goods
with indices in the set T to the first agent and the remaining goods to the second agent. The first two
agents achieve value z/2 each under this allocation and, hence, the p-mean welfare is exactly
(
2
m
) 1
p z
2 . If
the required set T does not exist, then in any allocation one of the first two agents has value y < z/2,
while the other has value at most y′ ≤ z− y. All other agents have valuation 0. Since the p-mean welfare
function is strictly concave in the values for p ∈ (0, 1), it follows that in this case any allocation has
p-mean welfare strictly less than
(
2
m
) 1
p z
2 . Hence, the NP-hardness of PARTITION implies that the fair
division problem at hand is NP-hard as well. ⊓⊔
9Instead of zero, we could also set vi(g) = ((z + si)
p
− zp) /2 for these agents and all goods. In any optimal allocation, all
goods must then be allocated to the first two agents.
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